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Abstract   As the world embarks on a transition toward a low-carbon economy, one 
common characteristic of alternatives to fossil fuels has gone surprisingly unex-
amined: the cost of these alternative sources is disproportionately concentrated in 
capital expenses, rather than operating expenses. Solar, wind, and hydro power have 
very low operating expenses: the cost of these power sources is largely in their con-
struction. Even nuclear power has low fuel costs compared to fossil fuel power 
sources. So as the world decarbonizes the power grid and electrifies the transporta-
tion sector, capital costs will grow increasingly important in the energy sector. At 
the same time, several trends in energy law have been conspiring to raise the cost 
of capital. First, privatization and deregulation of electric utilities mean that energy 
investors are less certain of recovering their capital investments. Second, a push for 
more public participation in decision-making on energy infrastructure has, at times, 
resulted in delays and uncertainty that make private companies even more wary of 
long-term capital investments in new energy facilities. Third, the drive for more 
careful and holistic environmental assessments of new energy facilities has, in some 
cases, further delayed new infrastructure, again making private investors wary of 
large, new investments. This Article considers how to manage these conflicting 
trends, describing how governments can achieve public participation and improved 
environmental assessment while, at the same time, ensuring the predictability that 
can support capital investment in a new energy economy. It also explores particular 
areas where these tensions may be irreconcilable, suggesting ways that governments 
may be able to serve the goals of expanded participation and assessment, while 
providing private capital with traction to achieve a transition away from fossil fuels. 
1. Introduction: Attracting Capital to Build the New Energy 
Economy 
The world is facing two monumental challenges that are in tension: maintaining 
broad-based economic growth while, at the same time, decarbonizing the world 
economy to meet global climate goals. To meet these challenges, the world will 
need to attract massive investment in new sources of power to expand electricity 
access in developing countries and replace coal power fleets in the world’s major 
economies. The International Energy Agency predicts that this task will require 
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more than two trillion dollars of new investment.1 Achieving these twin goals is 
made more difficult by another emerging tension in energy investment: low carbon 
energy investments are increasingly capital-intensive but, at the same time, several 
developments in energy law are making returns on investment more uncertain, rais-
ing the cost of capital.  
The United States Clean Power Plan (Plan)—the first attempt to control green-
house gas emissions from the existing power sector in the world’s largest econ-
omy—demonstrates how low carbon polies will require major capital investments. 
The Plan, currently on hold because of the U.S. Supreme Court and the incoming 
Trump administration, envisioned replacing the U.S. coal fleet with a mix of in-
creased power from solar and wind and natural gas power.2 Despite the massive 
environmental downsides of coal power, it minimizes capital costs: it is easy and 
cheap to transport to the places it is needed and to store where it is needed, which 
are major challenges for both natural gas and renewable power. In the run up to the 
Plan, in November 2014, the U.S. electric power reliability watchdog, the North 
American Electric Reliability Corporation warned that the Plan would endanger the 
reliability of electric service unless it was accompanied by a massive build out of 
gas and electricity transport and storage.3  
The electricity system must constantly match electricity supplied with electricity 
demanded. Solar and wind power, however, cannot be dispatched on demand—they 
are produced only when the sun shines or the wind blows and thus far we do not 
have ways to economically store electric power until it is needed. Natural gas can 
back up solar and wind, but it is a gas, which makes it expensive to transport and 
store. Power is also expensive to transport and store, so a transition from coal to 
renewables and natural gas would require expensive investments in both gas and 
power transport and storage.   
At the same time that this need for new transport infrastructure is building, there 
is increased uncertainty attached to energy investment around the world. First, pri-
vatization and deregulation of electric utilities has meant that less and less of power 
sector investment by companies is made based on a guaranteed rate of return 
through a regulatory compact. Second, increasing interest and activism focused on 
                                                            
1 International Energy Agency 2014. 
2 The Supreme Court prevented the Plan from taking effect, West Virginia v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
136 S. Ct. 1000, 1000 (2016), and thus far the courts have, at the request of the Trump administra-
tion, agreed to keep the Plan in limbo while the administration works to repeal it. Timothy Cama, 
Court suspends case over Obama climate rule, The Hill, April 28, 2017, http://thehill.com/pol-
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energy infrastructure has, at times, resulted in delays and uncertainty that made pri-
vate companies even more wary of long-term capital investments. Third, a trend 
toward more wide-ranging environmental assessments of new energy facilities—
embodied in the Keystone XL precedent and its application to facilities across the 
world, as explained in Section 3 of this chapter—has further delayed new infrastruc-
ture, again making private investors wary of large, new investments. Together these 
three trends are raising the cost of capital for investing in new energy infrastructure, 
and thus raising the cost of achieving the world’s environmental goals. 
This Article proceeds in four further parts. Section 2 describes why ongoing 
revolutions in energy markets and policy call for massive new capital investments 
in low carbon power production and transport. Section 3 describes how trends in 
energy law and policy are, at the same time, increasing the uncertainty and cost of 
long-term investment in the energy industry. Section 4 evaluates possible methods 
of encouraging more investment in the industry while accommodating the policy 
concerns that are resulting in increased delay and uncertainty for energy investors. 
Section 5 concludes. 
2. Transitioning to a Low Carbon Economy Will Require 
Massive Long-term Energy Investment 
As mentioned above, the transition to a low carbon economy requires massive cap-
ital investment in the energy system. Renewable power must be not only built but, 
potentially even more challenging, carried to centres of power demand by new 
power transmission. A natural gas boom will complement expanded renewable 
power better than coal, but it will require more pipelines to carry it to market and 
more storage to ensure that it is available when non-dispatchable wind and solar 
power fails. And to move transportation and other sectors away from oil, the econ-
omy will require more electricity and a more flexible electrical distribution grid. 
Renewable sources such as wind and utility-scale solar power are easiest to site 
in low-population density areas, which are often also the deserts and plains where 
these resources are richest. That power must be transmitted to the urban centres of 
electricity demand. This in turn requires multi-billion dollar investments in long-
distance power transmission.  
At the same time, transitioning to a low carbon economy will require closing 
coal plants. So until electricity storage becomes widely available and affordable, 
increased natural gas power will be required as a replacement to back up renewable 
sources that only provide power when the sun shines and the wind blows. And nat-
ural gas is a better complement for renewable power sources because it can easily 
  
be ramped up and down to balance solar and wind sources—offering little power 
when the sun is shining and the wind is blowing but providing a lot of power when 
those sources fail and consumers demand power.4  
But one persistent advantage of coal has been its ease of transport and storage. 
In much of the industrialized world towns grew up near coal mines and rivers that 
could transport coal and the existing railroad infrastructure was, in large part, de-
signed to facilitate movement of coal to centres of electricity demand. 
By contrast, gas will require much more expensive infrastructure to ensure that 
the precise amount of gas is constantly being delivered to exactly the places that it 
is needed to accommodate spikes in electricity demand or dips in renewable power 
supply. As a gas, it is more expensive to transport: long haul, air-tight pipelines are 
multi-million dollar projects, liquefaction facilities to bring gas to overseas markets 
cost tens of millions, and even the liquefied natural gas ships that shuttle between 
these facilities cost a quarter of a billion dollars each.5  
Storing gas also requires major capital investments. Coal can simply be stored 
in piles, but to store natural gas, a company must find an air-tight aquifer, depleted 
reservoir, or salt cavern that can hold the gas until it is needed. The difficulty of 
finding suitable storage locations was dramatically illustrated in 2016 when the 
Southern California Gas Company overfilled a storage reservoir at Aliso Canyon, 
creating a major leak that took four months to plug and forced thousands of citizens 
to abandon their homes.6  
As the world’s carbon reduction goals grow more ambitious, the need for capital 
investment will simply grow more pressing. For now, countries and regions that 
pursue climate regulation often limit their costs by relying on countries with lower 
ambitions for carbon regulation. For example, they can purchase emission reduc-
tions from foreign countries where they are cheap because those nations have not 
yet pursued inexpensive low-hanging-fruit reductions.7 Or they can import lower-
price electricity or commodities from these less-ambitious countries.8 But as climate 
targets grow stronger across the world, countries will increasingly be forced to ac-
tually close fossil-fuel plants and connect to new sources of renewable power that 
will often be far away. And they will be forced to build out electricity and natural 
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5 U.S. Department of Energy 2015. 
6 U.S. Energy Info. Admin. 2016. 
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gas storage to ensure that their grid remains reliable at high penetrations of renew-
able power.9 
Even further investments in power transmission infrastructure may be one im-
portant strategy to increase the reliability of intermittent sources like wind and solar 
power. If a regional grid can diversify the geographic area powering its renewable 
sources, they may provide more reliable power. Even if the sun is not shining in one 
region, it may be shining in a neighbouring state or country.10 
Finally, the most difficult stage in decarbonization—moving away from oil—
will require further capital investments. Oil is the most energy dense fossil fuel and 
it is easy to move because, as a liquid, it can be pumped by pipeline or be easily 
placed on ships, trucks, or rail cars. As we try to electrify our transport system we 
will need to expand power generation to accommodate this new demand and expand 
power transport to make sure that quick charging stations are widely available to 
support a flexible transportation network. 
3. Energy Law Trends Are Raising Uncertainty for Energy 
Investors and Increasing the Cost of Building the Energy Future 
At the same time, other trends in energy law are conspiring to raise uncertainty for 
energy investors. The transmission to competitive markets has meant that fewer in-
vestors can be certain that their energy investments will receive a steady stream of 
income that justifies the initial capital investment. At the same time, increased pub-
lic focus on energy infrastructure has repeatedly delayed energy infrastructure pro-
jects, increasing the risk that a project will never even be completed. Finally, ex-
panded environmental assessments have raised new hurdles to constructing new 
energy transport facilities.  
 
The most significant trend of the past thirty years in energy law is restructur-
ing—creating competition in markets through a combination of breaking down ver-
tically-integrated utilities and more surgical rate regulation of energy transport bot-
tlenecks that could otherwise exercise monopoly power.11 In many of the 
                                                            
9 The most plausible alternatives to a major build out in renewable power, such as nuclear power 
and carbon capture, would also require massive capital investment. Woite, 1978; Rao, 2007. 
10 Roques 2010. 
11 Sioshani 2006. 
  
jurisdictions that have pursued this restructuring—often described as “deregula-
tion”—these policies are seen as encouraging static efficiency, ensuring that power 
is provided by low cost facilities.  
 
The persistent concern, however, is that deregulated markets do not provide suf-
ficient incentive to encourage new power sources. Jurisdictions have turned to sev-
eral methods of supplementing power provider’s revenues from power auctions, 
such as capacity markets, long-term power purchase agreements, and specific cred-
its for favoured sources such as natural gas and nuclear power.12 If competitive mar-
kets are having difficulty motivating construction of conventional energy sources, 
how can they be expected to encourage an entirely revamped market driven by re-
newable power?  
In more recent years, the growing profile of the energy industry and increased 
focus on climate change have encouraged regulators at all levels of government to 
exert influence on energy infrastructure decisions. Increased awareness of global 
energy markets and the environmental consequences of energy production has cre-
ated unprecedented interest in the energy system and a demand for recognition of 
the legitimate and varied interests of national, subnational, and local stakeholders 
in energy decisions.  
This demand often manifests as a push for each level of government—federal, 
state, indigenous, and local—to have a say in decisions on energy transport. This 
enthusiasm has sometimes produced overlapping authorities and confused standards 
that have left the process for approval of energy facilities in flux.13 For example, in 
the United States, the separate long-standing approval processes for interstate oil 
pipelines, gas pipelines, and power transmission are all currently in flux. 
The federal government’s long-term practice has been to leave approval of in-
terstate oil pipelines mostly to the states—a pipeline company may build a pipeline 
as long as it has certificates or permits from all the states along the pipeline route.14 
But at the end of President Obama’s administration, the government announced that 
it would consider changing this standard and declared that it would do a full federal 
environmental review of the Dakota Access pipeline—a reversal of the usual federal 
policy. That decision was reversed by the incoming Trump administration and is 
now being litigated in the courts.15 As a result, there is continuing uncertainty about 
whether the federal government will be required to approve future oil pipelines. 
                                                            
12 Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC, 136 S.Ct. 1288 (2016). 
13 Coleman 2014. 
14 Klass and Meinhardt 2015. 
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Similarly, the states have long had control over interstate power transmission 
siting. Again, in its last year, the Obama administration announced a new policy, 
declaring that the federal government would partner with private transmission com-
panies that wanted to build interstate transmission to support wind power.16 The 
new administration has not yet suggested whether it will abide by this policy and it 
may, again, ultimately be decided by the courts, leaving investors uncertain about 
whether states or the federal government has final say on new transmission projects. 
Finally, interstate natural gas pipelines, unlike oil and power transport, have 
long been regulated by the federal government.17 But opposition to fracking has 
made U.S. states increasingly frustrated with their inability to stop pipeline projects 
that would cross their borders. New York may have hit upon an innovative solu-
tion—denying a local Clean Water Act permit to a pipeline that had already been 
approved by the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. That decision, too, 
is being challenged in court. 
Even when it is clear who the appropriate regulator is, new environmental re-
view standards and methods have created deep uncertainty about when energy pro-
jects will be approved. The success of environmental groups in delaying the Key-
stone XL project, a proposed pipeline that would carry oil from the Canadian oil 
sands to Steele City, Nebraska, has made it a model for environmental movements 
around the world, who are increasingly challenging energy transport projects across 
the fossil fuel supply chain: gas pipelines, port facilities, liquefied natural gas pro-
jects, and power transmission.18 
But it remains unclear what rule the Keystone XL precedent stands for. Key-
stone XL was initially proposed in 2008 and the seven-year environmental review 
of the project focused on how it would affect oil production in Canada: President 
Obama said that if it increased oil production in Canada, he would deny it.  
This focus was surprising for several reasons. First, the long-standing policy of 
the United States had been not to consider foreign impacts that were properly under 
the control of authorities in another country. Second, even in theory, it is very hard 
to say what the impact of a single pipeline facility will be on interstate energy mar-
kets. Third, the implied standard that energy projects should be denied if they will 
help an industry in a U.S. energy trading partners is, to say the least, diplomatically 
awkward. Fourth, the Keystone XL standard seems to be in direct conflict with the 
usual standard for approving pipelines, which is that they should be approved only 
if they would connect new sources of supply and demand. Even more confusing, 
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the Obama administration’s decision on Keystone XL stated that 1) it was unlikely 
to have any impact on oil production in Canada, but 2) it would nevertheless be 
perceived as increasing oil production and so 3) should be denied notwithstanding 
the lengthy analysis that had delayed the project.19  
Despite the difficulty in understanding what principal the Keystone XL prece-
dent stands for, it is becoming increasingly important worldwide, with environmen-
tal groups pushing for what they call “a climate test” for energy transport projects.20 
In the U.S., the Trump administration quickly reversed the previous administra-
tion’s decision, approving the pipeline, but again, the propriety of this decision has 
been challenged by several anti-pipeline groups and will be resolved in court. In the 
meantime, Canada has adopted its own version of the Keystone-like climate test, 
but is struggling with some of the same questions about how such a test can be 
implemented. 
These expanded climate assessments are, if anything, more dangerous to trans-
portation infrastructure of lower carbon sources such as electricity and gas. After 
all, even if no new pipelines are built, oil can be transported through the existing 
infrastructure such as rail, barge, trucks, and ship. Gas and renewable power, by 
contrast, must have new dedicated transmission facilities. Following the Keystone 
XL precedent energy transport opponents have grown much more savvy about chal-
lenging this transmission projects on the basis that they will encourage energy pro-
duction and consumption and all the externalities associated with that production—
water and air quality for natural gas production and land use and bird kills for wind 
projects. 
Each of these trends have, at times, resulted in overlapping authority and shifting 
standards that can make investors wary of the energy transport projects, such as gas 
pipelines and electricity transmission, required to drive a transition to a low-carbon 
economy. This kind of regulatory uncertainty is particularly dangerous to energy 
transport projects because they are capital intensive—most of their costs are up front 
and they only pay off over time—which makes them particularly vulnerable to reg-
ulatory uncertainty.21  
                                                            
19 U.S. Department of State 2015. 
20 Coleman 2017b. 
21 Teisberg 1993; Yang et al. 2004. 
  
4. Principles Towards Encouraging Investment in the Energy 
Future 
There has never been more need for energy investment but investors have never 
faced such uncertainty about whether their investments will pay off. If policymakers 
could lessen this uncertainty, they could lower the economic cost of meeting their 
goals for encouraging an energy transition. How can policymakers increase cer-
tainty while respecting the legitimate concerns of stakeholders that are intensely 
interested in regulatory approvals?  
4.1 Principle 1: Wide Participation, One Decision-Maker  
Governments must accommodate increased interest in energy projects. Stakeholder 
interest in the global energy industry, both within and beyond their jurisdiction, is 
entirely appropriate because carbon emissions from the energy industry affect all 
parts of the globe. Consumer interest in energy supply chains is here to stay and 
local, subnational, and national politicians will naturally be interested in what the 
industry does beyond their borders. To that end, governments should make in-
creased provision for wide participation in approvals of energy infrastructure, in-
cluding facilitating input from all levels of government.  
At the same time, ultimate decision-making authority on energy projects should, 
to the extent possible, be centralized. It is natural that policymakers frustrated at one 
level of government should seek to relitigate the issue at another level. But overlap-
ping decision-makers is a recipe for uncertainty and there is no a priori reason to 
think that subjecting each proposed project to multiple veto gates would improve 
the overall economic and environmental result. Multiple veto gates just mean more 
opportunities to kill proposed investments—and that is true whether those invest-
ments are in oil, in gas, or in renewable power. So long as we believe more energy 
investment is necessary, we should have a unified decision-making structure that 
allows such investments.  
Similarly, energy transport projects should not be used as opportunities to relit-
igate disputes about energy production that is decided by another governmental en-
tity. If the energy transport project presents issues that are intimately connected with 
approval of energy production, then perhaps the two issues can be decided in a sin-
gle procedure. But the transport decision should not be used after the fact with the 
goal of hampering a decision that has already been made about production. 
Canada’s traditional system of energy regulation may be a helpful model here. 
Canada has traditionally left issue of energy production (and, to an extent, local 
  
pollution) to each province’s sole authority. Interprovincial issues, by contrast, are 
for the federal government to decide; provinces have input, but cannot veto inter-
provincial projects. This overall system, sometimes known as “water-tight compart-
ments” allows for wide participation in energy decision-making but ensures that 
each issue is ultimately decided by a single responsible government.22 
4.2 Principle 2: Prospective Rulemaking for Environmental 
Reviews 
To the extent possible, changes to the rules of environmental assessment and the 
standards for approval should be implemented only prospectively, so that the goal-
posts are not moved half-way through the review process. This would allow contin-
ued improvement in environmental assessment while providing a measure of cer-
tainty to investors in interstate energy transport.   
For example, scientists continue to improve techniques for assessing the “life 
cycle” impacts of energy production—showing the net impact of a fuel over the full 
cycle from production to transport to consumption. These techniques, however, do 
not yet provide resolution to determine the impact of any single energy project. 
(And may never be able to provide this resolution.) Governments should continue 
attempting to improve this method of environmental assessment but should not im-
pose it as part of existing reviews. Developing experimental methods of study 
within an environmental review process simply imposes too much delay and uncer-
tainty on the environmental review process. 
5. Enabling the Energy Future 
The next decades will be crucial for answering the twin challenges of global energy 
policy: massively expanding energy access to support increased living standards 
across the world while, at the same time, transitioning to forms of energy that have 
less impact on the air, water, and the climate. Meeting these challenges will require 
an unprecedented build out of long-lived energy infrastructure: new zero carbon 
power generators, transmission to carry renewable power to market, and pipelines, 
storage and liquefaction facilities for natural gas to support that transition. Society 
will bear the cost of these investments, and this cost will be far smaller if investors 
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can be sure that stable policies will ensure that they can recover their investment 
over many, many years. And these investments must not be delayed given the inter-
generational cost of delay in moving to a new, low-carbon energy system. Thus, it 
has never been more crucial to find ways to accommodate increased interest and 
public participation in energy transport decisions without introducing uncertainty 
into the investment process.  
Bibliography 
Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC, 136 S.Ct. 1288 (2016). 
International Energy Agency, World Energy Investment Outlook (2014). 
James W. Coleman, Beyond the Pipeline Wars: Reforming Environmental Assessment of Energy 
Transport Infrastructure, 2017 UTAH LAW REVIEW __ (forthcoming 2017) 
James W. Coleman, Investing in the Shadow of the Law: How Agencies Are Using Proposed Rules 
to Transform Industry Long Before Final Rules Are Tested in Court, 24 GEORGE MASON LAW 
REVIEW 497 (2017).  
James W. Coleman, Importing Energy, Exporting Regulation, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1357 (2014).  
James W. Coleman, Importing Energy, Exporting Regulation, 38 HARVARD ENVTL. L. REV. 87 
(2014).  
Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S. Infrastructure Chal-
lenges, 100 IOWA L. REV. 947 (2015)  
Alexandra B. Klass & Jim Rossi, Reconstituting Federalism Battles in Energy Transportation, 41 
HARVARD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW __ (forthcoming 2017). 
Alastair R. Lucas, Mythology, Fantasy and Federalism: Canadian Climate Change Policy and Law, 
20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 41 (2007). 
Fabien Roques, Celine Hiroux, & Marcelo Saguan, Optimal wind power deployment in Europe—
A portfolio approach, 38 Energy Policy 3245 (2010) 
Edward Rubin, Chao Chen, & Anand Rao, Cost and performance of fossil fuel power plants with 
CO2 capture and storage, 35 ENERGY POLICY 4444 (2007) 
Fereidoon P. Sioshansi & W. Pfaffenberger, Electricity Market Reform: An International Perspec-
tive (2006). 
Elizabeth Olmsted Teisberg, Capital Investment Strategies under Uncertain Regulation, 24 RAND 
J. ECON. 591 (1993).  
U.S. Department of Energy, Natural Gas Infrastructure Implications of Increased Demand from 
the Electric Power Sector (2015). 
United States Department of State, Record of Decision and National Interest Determination (Nov. 
3, 2015). 
U.S. Energy Information Administration, Today in Energy: Southern California natural gas inven-
tories nearly flat this injection season, Aug. 9 2016, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/de-
tail.php?id=27432. 
U.S. North American Electric Reliability Corporation, Potential Reliability Impacts of EPA’s Pro-
posed Clean Power Plan: Initial Reliability Review (2014). 
Georg Woite, Capital Investment Costs of Nuclear Power Plants, International Atomic Energy 
Agency Bulletin (1978). 
Biao Yang, Neil D. Burns, & Chris J. Backhouse, Management of uncertainty through postpone-
ment, 42 INT’L J. PROD. RES. 1049 (2004). 
 
